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It is a great honor to be part of this lecture series, honoring the memory of
Walter Reckless and his outstanding contributions to the field of criminal justice. I
am particularly pleased to be part of a series that was inaugurated by Simon Dinitz,
and which has included a lecture by Randall Dale Adams, an innocent man who
served time on death row in Texas.
I
The United States criminal justice system is in the midst of a revolution.
Spawned by the advent of forensic DNA testing and hundreds of post-conviction
exonerations, the innocence revolution is changing assumptions about some central
issues of criminal law and procedure.
This revolution is quite different from those that preceded it. The Warren
Court's "rights revolution" was based on a controversial set of value judgments
pursuant to constitutional values of autonomy, integrity, and respect for the
individual, which trumped, in some instances, the interests in accurately
prosecuting criminal actors. Given the nature of these value judgments, it is not
overly surprising that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts--courts with value systems
quite different from the Warren Court's-have scaled back many of these
decisions.
The innocence revolution is quite different, as it addresses a value that
everyone shares: accurate determinations of guilt and innocence. Put another way,
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the innocence revolution is born of science and fact, as opposed to choices among
a competing set of controversial values.
The revolution has just begun, and it is far too early to reach definitive
conclusions about how dramatically it will transform criminal justice.
Nonetheless, it is safe to conclude that our newfound appreciation of the system's
fallibility is destined to leave a lasting mark on criminal law.
II
As anyone who reads the newspapers knows, wrongful convictions are being
exposed in this country with a great deal of regularity. Consider the case of
Michael Evans and Paul Terry, clients we represent at Northwestern University's
Center on Wrongful Convictions. These two men were incarcerated for twenty-six
years for rape and murder. They were sentenced to hundreds of years in prison and
had every reason to believe they would die in custody. Several years ago,
however, the lawyer who prosecuted these men suggested to me that the case
might warrant a second look. This lawyer explained that his newfound
understanding of wrongful convictions had led him to conclude that the evidence
presented against Evans and Terry was the sort that carried a high risk of error. He
suggested that we explore whether DNA might be available to corroborate or
refute the accuracy of the conviction. It took us about five years to find that DNA,
but we finally did. The results are now in and the DNA completely exonerates
both of these men. After twenty-six years!
This is just one example, representative of hundreds of wrongful conviction
cases that have been exposed over the past several years. Well over 100
individuals have walked off of death row based on innocence, proven by DNA or
other methods. In addition, well over 100 other individuals have been released
from life sentences or lengthy terms of imprisonment based on DNA testing alone.
It is easy to be awed by the power of DNA to free the innocent and to convict
the guilty. It is imperative, though, not to fall into the trap of believing that DNA
itself can solve the wrongful convictions crisis. DNA testing depends on the
perpetrator having left behind biological evidence susceptible to forensic testing.
In some crimes, such as sexual assaults, this occurs with great frequency. In other
crimes, though, including homicide, most crime scenes do not contain biological
evidence from the perpetrator that is susceptible to biological testing.
The great significance of DNA testing, therefore, is that it provides a window
into the error rate that exists in all cases. Moreover, as Barry Scheck, Peter
Neufeld and Jim Dwyer have argued so powerfully in their book, Actual
Innocence,' DNA exonerations provide great insights into the fallibility of
particular types of evidence that were once assumed extraordinarily trustworthy.
When DNA teaches us lessons about the incidence of eyewitness error or false
1 JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES
FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000).
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confessions, those lessons are not limited to DNA cases. The lessons apply with
equal force to cases that are not susceptible to forensic testing.
Consider the twelve death row inmates who have been exonerated based on
DNA testing in the past decade. Each of these men owes his life to the fact that the
victim in the murder for which he stood convicted was not only murdered but was
also raped. Had the victim not been raped, these men still would have been
completely innocent, but they would have been unable to prove their innocence
because the proof of their innocence came through DNA tests of semen associated
with the rape. Perversely, they are alive because they were "lucky" that the victim
was raped. That is the critical lesson here. DNA cannot solve the crisis, but it can
help illuminate the scope and nature of the problem.
This realization is often overlooked in the discussion of wrongful convictions.
For example, many state legislatures throughout the United States have enacted
statutes providing access to post-conviction DNA testing. These statutes are
critically important, but it is frightening when some of these legislators claim that
passing a testing statute is all that is needed to confront the crisis. We need to
ensure DNA testing whenever it is possible, but we also need to undertake reforms
based on the new knowledge that the results of these tests are generating.
Similarly, I am dismayed to hear people claim that these exonerations prove
that the system "works," because these individuals were freed prior to being
executed. Imagine an FDA inspector who examines a sampling of 100 hot dogs
from a factory that produces thousands each day. The inspector determines that
fifteen of these 100 hot dogs contain botulism. How would we react if the owner
were to proclaim relief that the inspector has identified and removed the fifteen
bad hot dogs from the factory, and that all the others were fine? Yet this is
precisely what some want to argue about the criminal justice system. We are not
able to inspect all convictions in the same manner that we can inspect convictions
susceptible to DNA corroboration or refutation. Instead, we must treat the DNA
cases as the equivalent of a random sampling of convictions and recognize that the
error rate this sampling reveals, and the nature of errors it reveals, replicates the
general error rate and sources of error among all cases.
The question, then, is no longer whether innocent people are convicted or
whether innocent people are sentenced to death. We now know that this happens
with a regularity that none of us ever imagined before. This is a very new
revelation. Only ten years ago some very reasonable people believed that the
frequency of wrongful convictions was so low that the issue was not worth a place
in the public policy debate. Only ten years ago, some very reasonable people
believed that our system was so committed to accuracy, so replete with procedural
protection, that it was virtually unthinkable that innocent defendants would be
convicted in any criminal case, much less a capital case. Today, we understand
that this confidence was misplaced.
Just as Columbus's revelations exploded many assumptions about the shape of
the world, DNA has exploded many of our assumptions about the reliability of
certain forms of evidence and the accuracy of convictions. It is time to draw new
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maps that take these lessons to heart. For purposes of this lecture, I shall limit my
observations to the impact this new understanding has on the debate over capital
punishment in the United States. It should go without saying, though, that the
lessons of innocence reach far beyond the death penalty into every aspect of the
criminal process.
III
The nature of the death penalty debate has changed significantly in recent
years. Not long ago, the debate over capital punishment was gauged in rather
abstract theoretical terms: the question presented was whether the government is
entitled to kill those convicted of certain awful crimes. This question, of course,
implicated many questions 'of theology, philosophy and political theory. We are all
familiar with this debate and we: know where the numbers come out when the
debate is framed in abstract terms: A significant majority of Americans support the
general idea that government has the right to impose capital punishment under
certain circumstances.
The problem with framing the debate in this manner is that the propriety of the
death penalty is hardly an abstract question. It is as practical an issue as one can
imagine. The major change in the death penalty debate is that discussion now
focuses on practical issues surrounding the imposition of capital punishment.
Newfound understanding of the flaws and vices associated with the application of
the death penalty is spawning growing opposition to executions.
A new group of abolitionists is emerging. These new abolitionists are not
particularly interested in the philosophical, theoretical, or theological debate about
the propriety of capital punishment. Rather, they have concluded that regardless of
whether one believes the government has the right to take life as an abstract matter,
one cannot support the death penalty given the practical issues surrounding the
unfairness and inaccuracy of its implementation.
This ever-growing group of pragmatic abolitionists serves as strong
confirmation of Justice Thurgood Marshall's thesis, set forth in Furman v.
Georgia,2 that once people learn about the realities surrounding application of the
death penalty they will turn away in droves from supporting capital punishment.
Justice Marshall argued that public support for the death penalty was, in effect, a
product of mass ignorance about the discrimination, arbitrariness and errors
associated with its application. For many years following the Furman decision in
1972, abolitionists sought to educate the public about these problems, but these
efforts fell, in large part, on deaf ears. It was easy enough to prove that the death
penalty was arbitrary and discriminatory, but those issues did not tend to spawn
massive public outcry. On the other hand, although the specter of innocent people
on death row was the kind of issue that could generate deep concern, throughout
2 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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the 1970s and 1980s the public remained unconvinced that it was really possible
for a truly innocent person to be sentenced to death.
It is worth reflecting on why the clear evidence of arbitrariness and
discrimination did not alone move public opinion significantly. Why is it that the
American people were willing to tolerate a system that allows race and class to
play so significant a role in the ultimate question of whom we will kill? The
reason, I suspect, is that these issues can be dismissed as problems of under-
inclusiveness, and under-inclusiveness is not an issue that tends to trigger moral
outrage among the general public. For example, imagine that a destitute African-
American man has been sentenced to death for the murder of a white woman.
Statistically, there may be strong evidence demonstrating that a wealthy white
defendant, or even a poor white defendant, would have been unlikely to receive a
death sentence for the same crime committed against an African-American
woman. Surely, as a matter of equal protection and fundamental fairness, such
discriminatory disparity is despicable. Yet, a member of the public might well
conclude that the way to remedy the unfairness is to impose the death penalty more
broadly-to make sure that whites convicted of killing African-Americans receive
the penalty as often as the African-Americans convicted of killing whites. The
concern, in other words, is not that a certain person is being executed, but that
other similarly situated people are not. This is a deep concern but not one that
necessarily convinces the masses to oppose the death penalty. In many people's
minds, if a defendant on death row committed a heinous crime, there is no reason
to spare him--or even be concerned about him-simply because other equally
guilty people might escape death.
The issue of innocence is different. There is no difficulty convincing the
public to be outraged that an innocent person has been condemned to die. This
defendant is not making an equal protection claim that you ought not kill me
unless you also kill others just like me. He is making the most basic kind of plea
imaginable: I am not guilty!
I have no doubt that if the.public can be convinced, on the facts, that innocent
people are being sentenced to death with some frequency, the death penalty will be
abolished in the United States. In other words, I submit that Justice Marshall's
thesis was only partially true: convincing the American people about the
arbitrariness and unfairness of the death penalty was not enough: it is the issue of
innocence that carries the real potential to transform American opinion on the use
of capital punishment.
IV
The Illinois experience is a wonderful example of the power of innocence. In
1978, Illinois reinstated the death penalty with the overwhelming support of the
public. By the early 1990s, Illinois had the fourth largest death row in the United
States. Between 1978 and the mid-1990s, the legislature had acted on several
occasions to expand the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty. No one
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would ever have imagined that Illinois was about to play a central role in
transforming American views on the death penalty.
Yet, in January 2000, Republican Governor George Ryan, a longstanding
supporter of the death penalty, declared a moratorium on executions. The engine
driving this action was a series of thirteen death row exonerations during the
1990s. This in a State that had executed twelve individuals since the death penalty
was reinstated in 1978. Thus, of twenty-five cases that had been finally resolved
(through either execution or exoneration), over fifty percent had been exposed as
wrongful convictions. Governor Ryan often explained that he is not a lawyer; he is
a pharmacist from Kankakee. He was sure that had his pharmacy been discovered
to have a fifty percent error rate in filling prescriptions, it would have been closed
down immediately. In his view, that same result followed whether he was a
pharmacist dispensing chemicals to heal or a governor dispensing chemicals to kill.
Upon declaring the moratorium, the Governor appointed a fifteen-member
blue ribbon commission to assess the capital justice system in Illinois and to
determine what needed to be fixed. Two years later, that Commission
recommended eighty-five reforms that were necessary to restore confidence in the
capital justice system. Even were all these reforms to be enacted, though, the
Commission cautioned that the risk of executing the innocent would remain.
In the aftermath of the Commission's report, as Governor Ryan's term in
office wound down, the Governor was asked to commute the sentences of all
Illinois death row inmates. Given the flaws in the system as documented by his
own Commission's study, the Governor was asked to ensure that no one convicted
or sentenced under that system be executed.
This effort to secure mass commutations was met with significant opposition.
Prosecutors argued that there were many cases in which there was no doubt about a
defendant's guilt and there was no reason to commute those sentences. Proponents
of the commutations countered by reminding the Governor that each of the
exonerated defendants had been convicted beyond a reasonable doubt and that in
several of those cases the courts had described the evidence against the defendant
as overwhelming. Yet, it turned out-often through a series of miracles that never
could have been anticipated by examining the paper record-that the defendant
was innocent. To be sure, proponents of the commutations agreed, most of those
on death row were guilty, but it was equally certain that some were innocent.
Some were still waiting for their miracle to come. The problem was identifying
which were which, and given the impossibility of doing that accurately, death
sentences should be taken off the table.
The Governor was also urged to consider the comparative magnitude of errors
in favor of executing versus errors in favor of imposing life without parole. On the
one hand, the specter of executing someone who was not guilty (or even someone
who was guilty but was not deserving of death) is our legal system's ultimate
nightmare. On the other hand, the prospect of imposing life imprisonment on
someone who is, in the view of some, deserving of death, is a far less devastating
error.
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Governor Ryan ultimately understood all of this. The Governor also
understood something richer and deeper. He understood that the system's error
rate in determining guilt has implications not only on the accuracy of convictions,
but also on the trustworthiness of capital sentences. If a system had proven itself
so flawed at answering the relatively easy, objective question of whether a
defendant committed a crime, how could that system possibly be trusted with the
far more complicated question of whether someone who has been convicted should
be sentenced to death? That latter decision requires the delicate balancing of
mitigating factors (such as mental illness, history of abuse, or impaired capacity)
with aggravating factors (such as future dangerousness, heinousness of the crime,
and criminal history). Governor Ryan understood that even if all 171 Illinois death
row inmates were, in fact guilty, that did not mean that the broken system's
decision that they should die was one worthy of trust.
After much obviously excruciating deliberation, Governor Ryan decided that
the risks were too much to bear. On January 10, 2003, Governor Ryan commuted
the sentences of all 167 inmates on Illinois' death row. Instead of execution, these
individuals would serve prison terms-in almost all cases, life imprisonment
without possibility of parole. In four other cases, the Governor pardoned inmates
on the ground of actual innocence, concluding that the only evidence against them
were untrustworthy confessions that were extracted through physical torture.
The Governor's actions were met with mixed reactions from predictable
circles. Despite widespread predictions of intense public outrage, however, a St.
Louis Dispatch poll showed that approximately fifty percent of Illinoisans
supported the Governor's decision to commute all sentences.
3
Now, twelve months after the commutations, there is no doubt that the climate
toward capital punishment in Illinois has changed dramatically. The newly elected
Governor, a supporter of capital punishment, has announced that he will maintain
the moratorium indefinitely. The legislature has enacted a set of significant
reforms designed to enhance the accuracy of capital proceedings. In the meantime,
it appears that juries and judges have become far less inclined to impose death
sentences. Only two death sentences have been imposed during this ten-month
period. This rate is a far cry from the average of thirteen death sentences imposed
each year during the 1980s.
The Illinois experience is a strong testament to the power of the innocence
issue to have a bold impact on the death penalty debate. Unlike other challenges to
the fairness of capital proceedings, which have failed to stimulate widespread
public outrage, evidence of the system's propensity to factual error has the power
to open closed minds and trigger reexamination of the costs and benefits of capital
punishment. This reexamination has led many former supporters of the death
penalty to join the chorus of the new abolitionists.
3 Kevin McDermott, Illinoisans are Split Closely on Ryan's Commutations; Death Penalty has
more, stronger support in Missouri than Illinois, Poll Shows, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 7,
2003, at Al.
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V
As a descriptive matter, the power of innocence on public opinion is
unmistakable. It is important to consider, though, whether as a normative matter
the innocence issue deserves this much attention. Is the public's interest in
exonerations simply an example of media fascination with sensational anecdotes,
or is this a phenomenon that deserves a prominent place in the death penalty
debate?
Under one view, the proof that innocent people are condemned to die is
dispositive of the debate without more. To many, showing that there is any risk of
executing innocent defendants is enough to show that the death penalty is
intolerable. This theme was captured in the classic statement of the Marquis de
Lafayette that, "[t]ill the infallibility of human judgments shall have been proved
to me, I shall demand the abolition of the death penalty.
'A
Is this view superficial? Some argue it is, pointing out that there are many
areas of life in which we accept the risk of innocent people suffering, or even
dying. For example, all would agree that the risk of wrongful convictions is no
argument in support of abolishing prisons. This is not because we dismiss the
horrors of incarcerating innocent people. Rather, we tolerate the costs of
incarcerating the innocent because the benefits of having a prison system-even
one that bears those risks-is so obvious that we cannot even begin to imagine life
without prisons. In a world without prisons, anarchy and violence would reign.
Hence, we have no choice but to maintain prisons despite the inevitability of
incarcerating some innocent people (although we most certainly have a duty to do
everything in our power to minimize the risk of error). Similarly, we know that
immunizations carry some inevitable risk of killing healthy children, yet we have
concluded that the value of immunizations, in terms of lives saved, justifies their
continued use.
Therefore, to analyze whether the significant risk of executing the innocent is
an independent justification for abolishing the death penalty, it is necessary to look
at the putative benefits of the death penalty, and to compare these with its costs,
which we now, for the first time, know to include the risk of wrongful conviction
(and sentences). Is the death penalty similar to jails in that it is beyond doubt that
we must maintain it regardless of its costs? Is it similar to immunizations, where
we can point to a clear net gain in lives saved?
The comparison to the necessity of jails can be dismissed readily. The need
for incarcerating dangerous criminals is beyond dispute; every society does this in
one form or another. Obviously, the need to impose capital punishment is nowhere
near as obvious or universally recognized. Here in the United States, twelve states
find it perfectly acceptable to proceed without capital punishment. The same is
4 Charles Lucas, Recuei Des D~bats Des Assemblies Ligislatives De La France Sur La
Question De La Peine De Mort, pt. 2, 42 (1831), quoted in VOICES AGAINST DEATH: AMERICAN
OPPOSITION TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1787-1975, at 98 (Philip English Mackey ed., 1976).
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true for the rest of North America, all of Europe, and almost all of South America.
Indeed, even in those thirty-eight American states that maintain the death penalty,
a sentence of death is imposed in only about two percent of murder cases.
Anarchy does not result in jurisdictions or cases in which capital punishment is not
imposed, so the analogy to prisons is a rather empty one.
Is the comparison to immunizations a more apt one? At one level it is. Many
of those who support the death penalty argue that, on balance, capital punishment,
like immunizations, saves innocent lives. They are willing to treat the execution of
innocent defendants as "collateral damage" in our war on crime. There is nothing
theoretically flawed in this approach from a utilitarian perspective. Nonetheless, I
agree with the intuition of so many Americans that this defense of capital
punishment fails on the facts because there is no conclusive evidence to show that
the death penalty provides sufficient value to justify its costs, particularly when
those costs include the risk of executing the innocent and undeserving.
Before evaluating some of these costs and benefits, the burden of proof in this
debate should be defined. In any individual criminal case, we demand proof
beyond a reasonable doubt before we are willing to impose punishment on a
defendant. That same burden ought to apply to the systemic question of whether
we should be imposing capital punishment. In order to justify that action, we
should demand proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the benefits of imposing that
punishment outweigh its costs.
So how do the benefits of the death penalty compare with the costs? Is there
proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the penalty returns value that outweighs the
costs it generates? Although detailed evaluation of all asserted benefits of capital
punishment is not possible here, I will examine three of the primary values asserted
by supporters of capital punishment.
At one time in history the most persuasive argument for capital punishment
was incapacitation, also known as specific deterrence. The fear that a violent
inmate would kill while in prison persuaded many that killing such prisoners was
not only justified, but was indispensable to public safety. To the extent that this
argument had potency, it has been overtaken by technology. The advent of
SuperMax correctional facilities now enables states to house particularly
dangerous inmates under conditions that completely neutralize the inmate. If need
be, the dangerous inmate can be contained in a setting that completely isolates him
from any human contact: all food can be served through automation; showers are
contained within the isolated cell; solitary recreation can take place in a fenced
area adjacent to the cell, the door of which can be opened remotely. These
technological advances have provided a method-one that does not involve
killing-to incapacitate prisoners and prevent further criminal behavior.
A second argument often offered in support of the death penalty is general
deterrence: that individuals considering committing murder will decide against it
because of the incremental difference between the risk of being executed and the
risk of being imprisoned for life without possibility of parole. At the common-
sense level, this claim seems preposterous. Life in prison is so unattractive that
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any deterrence that criminal penalties are capable of achieving is most assuredly
accomplished by that threat alone. Those who commit murders despite that threat
almost always either (a) believe that they will not be identified or (b) do not care at
the moment of the murder what might happen to them. Most of the studies that
have been done on the subject of general deterrence confirm this. Although a few
recent studies have concluded that executions deter murders, the overwhelming
consensus of criminologists is that capital punishment does not deter others from
committing murders. Certainly, proponents of the general-deterrence-hypothesis
cannot come close to proving their claim by the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard that we ought to demand before we opt to kill.
Another argument in support of capital punishment that has risen to particular
prominence in recent years is that victims' families deserve closure, which can
only be accomplished through the execution of the perpetrator. During an era in
which much focus has been placed on the victims' rights movement, this argument
has much surface appeal. Upon analysis, though, this defense of capital
punishment cannot justify proceeding with a system that carries the risk of
executing the innocent and the undeserving.
No caring person can be unmoved by the plight of murder victims' families.
Indeed, were it the case that executing convicted killers could bring murder victims
back to life there would be no doubt, in my mind, that we should be executing
convicted killers swiftly and regularly. Under that scenario, the costs of error
would be overwhelmed by the value of execution. The sad fact is, though, that we
cannot resurrect the dead by executing others.
Nonetheless, the claim is made that executions are essential for the families of
some murder victims to heal. This assertion is often advanced by family members
themselves, and there is a natural resistance to challenge the thesis for fear of
appearing callous or insensitive to the views of victims who have suffered so much
pain. To the extent that important public policy issues are at stake, though, it is
essential to subject the healing/closure argument to critical analysis. We should do
this with great sensitivity and compassion for those who have been victimized.
Nonetheless, we must conduct the inquiry rigorously to determine whether the
posited benefits truly provide adequate return in light of the human costs imposed.
That sober inquiry reveals that the goals of promoting healing among the
families of murder victims cannot justify the continued use of capital punishment.
There is simply no evidence that executions deliver on their promise of promoting
the psychological welfare of murder victims' families. (Of course, even if the
evidence did suggest that families of murder victims were made better off by
executions, we would still have to tackle the question of whether it is morally
justified to inflict immense pain upon one set of innocent families-those of
convicted murderers-in order to provide another set of innocent families with
psychological comfort.)
For example, there is no evidence that families of murder victims in non-death
states such as Michigan or Wisconsin endure more lasting pain than families of
murder victims in death states such as Texas or Ohio. Remember also that only
582 [Vol 1:573
THE INNOCENCE RE VOLUTIONAND THE DEATH PENALTY
two percent of all murders are punished with the death penalty, even in death
penalty states. If we really believed that executions were essential to the well-
being of victims' families, how could we betray these other ninety-eight percent of
families by depriving them of healing? Not one study of which I am aware has
ever found that the psychological health of families in cases in which executions
have been imposed is better than in cases in which life sentences are imposed.
The fact is, though, that many families of murder victims passionately believe
that the execution of the convicted murderer is essential to their recovery. There
is, of course, a strong and ever growing contrary movement among victims'
families, exemplified by the work of Murder Victims' Families for Reconciliation,5
but what are we to make of the fact that so many victims' families show up at
executions and rally so vehemently in support of the death penalty?
The answer to this question turns, I believe, on how we tend to treat these
victims' families. These people are faced with unspeakable pain that accompanies
the murder of a loved one. Yet instead of reaching out to them with meaningful
support and love, our societal response is to tell them that all we can do for them is
to kill the convicted perpetrator. Resources that could be used for counseling and
economic assistance are diverted into the quest for an execution. It is surely no
surprise, and most certainly not the fault of these victims, that they come to support
the only measure held out for them as the key to recovery. All they know is that
there is a gaping hole in their hearts, and they are told that this hole might be
repaired somewhat by the execution of the convicted murderer. Who can blame
them for clinging on to that one and only hope? We have no right to denigrate
these victims' good-faith belief that execution will bring them peace. We have a
duty, though, to indict a system that offers victims no hope except revenge and the
misguided and unproven promise that executions will bring solace.
Those who oppose the application of the death penalty have a moral
imperative to consider this point and to work on ways in which alternatives to
executions can be made available to the family victims of murders. It is perverse
for us to be so full of compassion toward accused killers, but to ignore the pain of
those whose lives have been turned upside down by murderous acts.
VI
When many states throughout America decided to reinstate the death penalty
in the late 1970s, their citizens and the courts were told that the new and improved
death penalty would overcome many of the vices that plagued the systems that
were struck down in Furman v. Georgia. We have now had more than twenty-five
years of experience and we have learned that this promise has been breached. The
death penalty is still administered in arbitrary ways. It still focuses almost
exclusively on those who cannot afford good lawyers and who do not have the
benefit of a quality public defender system. It still remains a bastion of racial
5 See http://www.mvfr.org (last updated Jan. 2004).
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discrimination. And it still condemns innocent people to die with frightening
regularity. Even if these first three points are incapable of moving public and
judicial opinion on the subject of capital punishment, the last of these facts has
proven very potent. The innocence revolution has arrived.
